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Abstract
We analyse the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the per-
spective of e¢ cient aggregation of votersprivate information. While new in judgment
aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a di¤erent body of literature about
voting between two alternatives when voters disagreements stem (fully or partly)
from conicts of information rather than interests. Combining the two literatures, we
consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information
underlying votersjudgments. We analyse the resulting strategic incentives and de-
termine which voting rules lead to collective judgments that e¢ ciently use all private
information, assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments.
We nd that in many, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides
on each issue according to whether the proportion of yesvotes exceeds a particular
quota.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, private information, e¢ cient information aggrega-
tion, strategic voting
1 Introduction
In the by now well-established theory of judgment aggregation, a group needs to
form a yes or no judgment on di¤erent issues, based on the judgments of the
group members on these issues. For instance, the jury in a court trial might need
to form judgments on whether the defendant has broken the contract, and whether
the contract is legally valid; the United Nations security council might need to form
judgments on whether country X is threatened by a military coup, and whether the
economy of country X is collapsing; and so on. Group judgments matter in practice.
They may determine group action: in the court trial example, they may determine
whether the defendant is convicted, and in the United Nations example they may
determine whether a large-scale international intervention in country X will happen.
So far, nearly the entire judgment aggregation theory follows the classical social-
choice theoretic approach of aiming to nd out how and whether group judgments
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can reect the individualsjudgments in a procedurally fair manner, where fair is
spelled out in terms of axiomatic conditions on the aggregation rule (such as the an-
onymity condition or the Pareto-type condition of respecting unanimous judgments).
The recent Symposium on Judgment Aggregation in Journal of Economic Theory (C.
List and B. Polak eds., 2010, vol. 145(2)) illustrates well this social-choice theoretic
approach, as well as the state of the art of the theory, which we review below. This
approach is certainly important in many contexts. It is nonetheless surprising that
little attention is given to a di¤erent, epistemicapproach of aiming to track the truth,
i.e., reach true group judgments. The theory does not model the private information
underlying votersjudgments, thereby preventing itself from studying questions of ef-
cient information aggregation. Yet such an epistemic perspective seems particularly
natural in the context of aggregating judgments (rather than preferences1). In our
court trial example, the ultimate goal seems indeed to be to nd out independent
facts (of whether the defendant has broken the contract and whether the contract is
legally valid). So, the jurys voting rule should be optimised with respect to the goal
that the resulting group judgments are true, not that they are fair to the jurors.
This alters the mechanism design problem altogether. Properties of voting rules
standardly assumed in judgment aggregation theory, such as respecting unanimous
judgments or anonymity, cannot be taken for granted anymore. If they turn out to
be justied, they derive their justication from the truth-tracking goal rather than
fairness considerations. To illustrate the contrast, suppose each juror expresses the
judgment (opinion) that the contract was broken. A collective broken judgment
would then of course count as good from the classical social-choice theoretic per-
spective of procedural fairness. However, from a truth-tracking perspective, much
depends on questions such as whether the jurorsjudgments are su¢ cient evidence
for breach of contract, and whether voters have expressed their judgments truthfully.
This paper analyses judgment aggregation from the truth-tracking and strategic-
voting perspective. We model votersprivate information, allowing us to ask questions
about e¢ cient information aggregation and strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game
setting. Though new within judgment aggregation theory, this approach is well-
established in a di¤erent body of literature about voting between two alternatives,
which started with seminal work by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997) and can be placed in the broader context of work on the
Condorcet Jury Theorem (see the review below). In the base-line case, voters share a
common interest of nding out the correctalternative, but hold possibly conicting
private information about which of the alternatives might be correct. The voting rule
should be designed so as to help nding the correctalternative by making optimal
use of all the private information scattered across the voters. So, the goal is e¢ cient
information aggregation. Such an epistemicbinary collective choice problem can in
fact be viewed as a special judgment aggregation problem, involving just one issue.
Our court trial example involves two issues: rstly, whether the contract was broken,
and secondly, whether it is legally valid. If instead only the rst issue were on the
jurys agenda, the jury would face a single-issue judgment aggregation problem, or
1 In preference aggregation theory, the core of social choice theory, an epistemic perspective would
be less natural since there is no true preferenceto be found.
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equivalently, a binary collective choice problem. The entire machinery and results of
the mentioned binary collective choice literature could then be applied in order to
design the voting rule.
This paper therefore combines two so far disconnected bodies of work, namely
the judgment aggregation literature and the mentioned binary collective choice liter-
ature. We believe that these two literatures can learn from each other, and that a
fruitful combination can help ll gaps in each of them. Indeed, it seems important
that the former benets from methodologies developed by the latter, and that the
latter is extended beyond single-issue agendas towards more complex agendas with
multiple issues. Analysing this multi-issue case does not reduce to analysing each
issue separately, since preferences establish links between di¤erent issues.
It is worth starting simple. This paper therefore assumes that the group faces an
agenda with just two issues, the simplest kind of multi-issue agenda; but many of our
results generalize easily. Though simple, agendas with just two issues are important
in practice. Our court trial example and United Nations example each involve two
issues. To mention further two-issue agendas, a medical commission might need to
issue joint judgments on whether a therapy is e¤ective, and whether it is compatible
with given ethical standards; members of a political party in charge of elaborating
the party programme might seek joint judgments on whether a tax cut is a¤ordable,
and whether it is popular; a university hiring committee might seek joint judgments
on whether a given candidate is good at research, and whether he or she is good at
teaching; and nally, economic advisors to a government during the banking crisis in
2008 might need to issue collective judgments on whether a given bank has short-term
liquidity problems, and whether it has long-term liquidity problems.
The issues of an agenda could in principle be mutually interconnected, so that the
judgments taken on the issues logically constrain each other; for instance, a nojudg-
ment on all issues might be inconsistent. Indeed, interconnections are what render
judgment aggregation non-trivial if the usual social-choice theoretic approach of pro-
cedural fairness is taken.2 However, within our truth-tracking approach, mechanism
design is non-trivial even if the issues are mutually independent. We therefore assume
independence between issues, leaving the case of interconnections to future research.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 introduces our model, in which voters vote on the
basis of private information and are guided by truth-tracking preferences, i.e., aim
for true collective judgments. Section 3 addresses the key question of how to design
the voting rule such that it leads to e¢ cient decisions as well as simple-minded,
truthful voting behaviour in equilibrium. It will turn out that in many, but not all
cases one should use a quota rule, which decides on each issue according to whether
the number of yesjudgments on the issue exceeds a particular quota. The details
depend on the exact kind of truth-tracking preferences, i.e., whether preferences are
simpleor consequentialistin a sense dened below. Section 4 analyses the notion
of truthful behaviour, by determining the conditions under which a sincerevoter
2 In the absence of interconnections one can safely aggregate by taking a separate vote on each
issue. This never generates inconsistent collective judgments and meets all standard social-choice
theoretic requirements such as anonymity.
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directly reveals his information in his vote. Finally, the appendix contains all proofs.
Literature review. We now selectively review the two literatures to which this paper
connects, beginning with judgment aggregation theory. As mentioned, this theorys
primary objective has so far been to nd out which voting rules can aggregate the
judgments of group members over some issues in accordance with certain axiomatic
requirements with a classic social-choice theoretic avour, such as unanimity preser-
vation (the counterpart of the Pareto principle) and independence (the counterpart
of Arrows independence of irrelevant alternatives). A series of possibility and im-
possibility results successfully address this query, by giving answers which depend,
rstly, on the axiomatic requirements on the voting rule, and secondly, on the agenda
of issues under consideration (e.g., List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2006, 2007, 2010,
Nehring and Puppe 2008, 2010, Dietrich and List 2007a, 2008, Dokow and Holzman
2010a, 2010b, Dietrich and Mongin 2010; see also precursor results by Guilbaud 1952
and Wilson 1975; for an introductory overview see List and Polak 2010). By con-
trast, a small minority of papers about judgment aggregation take a truth-tracking
perspective (e.g., Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006 and List 2005). Their innovation is
to apply the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem to judgment aggregation. Despite
taking a truth-tracking perspective, they have little in common with our work, since
private information and strategic incentives are not being considered.3 List and Pettit
(2011) provide the most systematic philosophical analysis of the truth-tracking ap-
proach, already discussing strategic incentives and private information and drawing
on the second body of literature to which we now turn.
As for this second body of literature, it is concerned with voting rules for binary
choice problems in which disagreements are driven (partly or totally) by conicting
information rather than conicting interests. Specically, the utilities which voters
derive from decisions are a¤ected by the same unknown state of the world, about
which voters have private information. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1997) show that it typically cannot be rational for all voters
to vote sincerely, and that the choice of voting rule matters considerably for sin-
cere voting and e¢ cient information aggregation. While the former authors consider
the purely epistemiccase without conict of interest, the latter authors introduce
some preference heterogeneity (and focus primarily on large electorates). Austen-
Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) add an extra dimension of pre-voting deliberation.
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) extend the approach to continuous rather than binary
private information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi
(2000) examine the (in)e¤ectiveness of unanimity rule in protecting the innocentin
jury trials. Goertz and Maniquet (2011) analyse e¢ cient information aggregation in
large electorates, showing that approval voting outperforms other voting rules in their
setting.
3Dietrich and List (2007b) analyse strategic voting in judgment aggregation, but in a sense not
relevant to us since strategic voting is not modelled as coming from private information and a voter
is motivated by the somewhat di¤erent goal that the collective judgments match his own judgments.
Such assumptions are more natural under common knowledge of each others judgments than under
informational asymmetry. See also related work by Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2007).
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2 The Model
2.1 A simple judgment aggregation problem
We consider a group of voters, labelled i = 1; :::; n; where n  2. This group needs
a collective judgment on whether some proposition p or its negation p is true, and
whether some other proposition q or its negation q is true. In our court trial example,
p states that the contract was broken, and q that it is legally valid; in our job candidate
example, p states that the candidate is good at research, and q that he or she is good
at teaching; and so on for our other examples. The four possible judgment sets are
fp; qg; fp; qg; fp; qg and fp; qg; we abbreviate them by pq, pq, pq and pq, respectively.
For instance, pq means accepting p but not q. Each voter votes for a judgment set
in J = fpq; pq; pq; pqg. After all voters cast their votes, a collective decision in J is
taken using a voting rule. Formally, a voting rule is a function f : J n ! J , mapping
each voting prole v = (v1; :::; vn) to a decision d  f(v). Among the various voting
rules, quota rules stand out as particularly natural and common. A quota rule is given
by two thresholds mp;mq 2 f0; 1; :::; n + 1g, and for each voting prole it accepts p
[q] if and only if at least mp [mq] voters accept it in the prole. Quota rules have
three salient properties:
 Anonymity: For all voting proles (v1; :::; vn) 2 J n and all permutations (i1; :::;
in) of the voters, f(vi1 ; :::; vin) = f(v1; :::; vn). Informally, the voters are treated
equally.
 Monotonicity: For all voting proles v;v0 2 J n, if for each r in f(v) the voters
who accept r in v also accept r in v0, then f(v0) = f(v). Informally, additional
support for the collectively accepted propositions never reverses the collective
acceptance of these propositions.
 Independence: The decision on each proposition r 2 fp; qg only depends on
the votes on r.4 Informally, the group in e¤ect takes two separate votes, one
between p and p and one between q and q.
Remark 1 A voting rule f : J n ! J is a quota rule if and only if it is anonymous,
monotonic and independent.
We briey sketch the proof of the non-trivial direction of implication. As can be
shown, if a voting rule f : J n ! J is anonymous and independent, then it is given
by two setsMp;Mq  f0; 1; :::; ng, in the sense that for each voting prole v 2 J n the
decision f(v) contains r (2 fp; qg) if and only if the number of votes in v containing
r belongs to Mr. If f is moreover monotonic, each set Mr can be shown to take the
form fmr;mr + 1; :::; ng for some threshold mr 2 f0; 1; :::; n + 1g. Clearly, f is the
quota rule with thresholds mp and mq.
4Given a voting prole v, the subprole with respect to r is denoted vr (2 fr; rgn), and the
collective decision with respect to r is denoted fr(v) (2 fr; rg). Independence means that for all
voting proles v;v0 2 J n, if vr = v0r, then fr(v) = fr(v0) .
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2.2 A common preference for true collective judgments
Exactly one judgment set in J is correct, i.e., contains propositions which are fac-
tually true. It is called the state (of the world) and is generically denoted by s. For
instance, the state might be pq, so that p and q are true (and p and q are false). Voters
have identical preferences, captured by a common utility function u : J  J ! R
which maps any decision-state pair (d; s) to its utility u(d; s). Given voterstruth-
tracking goal, one would expect u(d; s) to be high if d = s, i.e., if the decision is
correct. But how exactly should u be specied? We focus on two natural kinds of
preferences:
Simple preferences. Here, the utility function is given by
u(d; s) =

1 if d = s (correct decision)
0 if d 6= s (incorrect decision). (1)
Such preferences are the simplest candidate for truth-tracking preferences. Correct
decisions are preferred to incorrect ones, without further sophistication.
Consequentialist preferences. Here, we assume that the decision leads to one
of two possible consequences, typically representing group actions. This is captured
by a consequence function Co which maps the set of possible decisions J to a two-
element set of possible consequences. The consequence function might look as follows
in examples given earlier. In our court trial example, the court decision pq leads to
conviction, since both premises of guilt are found to be satised (Co(pq) = convic-
tion), while the other decisions all lead to acquittal (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = Co(pq) =
acquittal). In our job candidate example, the decision pq leads to a hire since the
candidate is seen as meeting both criteria (Co(pq) = hire), while the other decisions
all lead to no hire (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = Co(pq) = no hire). In our United Nations
example, the decisions pq and pq each lead to a large-scale international intervention
in country X (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = intervention), whereas the decisions pq and pq
both lead to no intervention since the United Nations then consider an intervention
as being too risky or unnecessary, respectively (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = no intervention).
In our bank rescuing example, the decisions pq and pq each lead to a governmental
rescue plan for the bank (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = rescue), whereas the decisions pq and
pq both lead to no rescue plan since a rescue is seen as infeasible or unnecessary,
respectively (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = no rescue). The consequentialist utility function is
given by
u(d; s) =

1 if Co(d) = Co(s) (correct consequence)
0 if Co(d) 6= Co(s) (incorrect consequence). (2)
Incorrect decisions (d 6= s) can have correct consequences (Co(d) = Co(s)). The
hiring committee might view the candidate as good at research and bad at teaching
when in fact the opposite is true, so that the resulting consequence (no hire) is
correct for wrong reasons. This gives high utility under consequentialist preferences,
but low utility under simple preferences.5
5 In the judgment aggregation literature, the two possible consequences are usually represented by
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2.3 Private information and strategies
If voters had not just common preferences, but also common information about what
the state might be, then no disagreement could arise. We however allow for in-
formational asymmetry. Each voter has a type, representing private information or
evidence.6 A voters type takes the form of an element of J , generically denoted
by t. For instance, a voter of type t = pq has evidence for p and for q. We write
t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 J n for a prole of voterstypes. Nature draws a state-types com-
bination (s; t) 2 J n+1 according to a probability measure denoted Pr. When a
proposition r 2 fp; p; q; qg is meant to represent part of voter is type rather than
part of the true state, we often write ri for r. For instance, Pr(pijp) is the probab-
ility that voter i has evidence for p given that p is true. By assumption, the prior
probability that r (2 fp; p; q; qg) is true is denoted
r = Pr(r)
and belongs to (0; 1), and the probability of getting evidence for r given that r is true
is denoted
ar = Pr(rijr),
belongs to (1=2; 1), and does not depend on the voter i. The parameters ap; ap; aq; aq
measure the reliability of private information, as they represent probabilities of re-
ceiving truth-telling information. The lower bound of 1/2 reects the (standard)
idea that information is more reliable than a fair coin.
By assumption, voters types are independent conditional on the state, and in
addition the state and the types w.r.t. p are independent of the state and the types
w.r.t. q.7 These independence assumptions allow one to express the joint distribution
of the state and the types by just a few parameters, namely p; q; ap; ap; aq; aq. For
instance, the probability that the state is pq and all voters receive the truth-telling
evidence pq is
Pr(pq; p1q1; p2q2; :::; pnqn) = Pr(pq) Pr(p1q1; p2q2; :::; pnqnjpq) = pqanpanq .
Each voter submits a vote in J based on his type. A (voting) strategy is a function
 : J ! J , mapping each type t 2 J to the types vote v = (t). We write
 = (1; ::::; n) for a prole of votersstrategies. Together with a voting rule f and
a common utility function u, we now have a well-dened Bayesian game.
For a given type prole t 2 J n, we call a decision d e¢ cient if it has maximal
expected utility conditional on the full information t.8 Some common notions of
voting behaviour can now be adapted to our framework:
two conclusion propositions, c and c. In our rst two examples, the consequence function is encoded
in the biconditional c$ (p ^ q), whereas in our last two examples it is encoded in the biconditional
c$ ((p ^ q) _ (p ^ q)).
6The type could represent information that is not shared with other voters because of a lack of
deliberation or limits of deliberation. More generally, a voter is type could represent uncertainty of
other voters about is beliefs.
7Recall that the state consists of a proposition in fp; pg and another in fq; qg. The rst [second] of
these propositions is what we call the state w.r.t. p [q]. A voters type w.r.t. p [q] is dened similarly.
8 I.e., d maximizes E(u(d; S)jt) = Ps2J u(d; s) Pr(sjt), where S denotes the random variable
generating the state s in J .
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 A strategy  of a voter is informative if (t) = t for all types t. An informative
voter directly reveals his information in his vote.
 A strategy  of a voter is sincere if for every type t, the vote (t) maximises
the expected utility conditional on the information t. A sincere voter votes
for the decision which maximises the expected utility conditional on his type;
so, he acts as if his vote alone determined the decision, neglecting the other
voters and their strategies. Technically, this amounts to optimal behaviour in
a hypothetical single-player decision problem.
 A strategy prole  = (1; :::; n) is rational if each strategy is a best response
to the other strategies, i.e., if the prole is a Nash equilibrium of the corres-
ponding Bayesian game. Hence, each voter maximises the expected utility of
the collective decision given the strategies of the other voters. (In this max-
imisation exercise, it turns out that a voter must only consider cases in which
his vote is pivotal. Under a quota rule with majority thresholds, a voter is for
instance pivotal if half of the other voters votes pq and the other half votes pq.)
 A strategy prole  = (1; :::; n) is e¢ cient if for every type prole t =
(t1; :::; tn) the resulting decision d = f(1(t1); :::; n(tn)) is e¢ cient (i.e., has
maximal expected utility conditional on full information t). Hence, all the
information spread across the group is used e¢ ciently: the collective decision is
no worse than a decision of a (virtual) social planner who has full information.
While informativeness and sincerity are properties of a single strategy (or voter),
rationality and e¢ ciency refer to an entire prole.
Finally, to avoid distraction by special cases, we make two assumptions. First,
we exclude the degenerate case in which some decision in J is not e¢ cient for any
type prole whatsoever. Second, we exclude e¢ ciency ties, i.e., we exclude those
special parameter combinations such that some type prole t leads to di¤erent e¢ cient
decisions (with di¤erent consequences when we assume consequentialist preferences).
3 Which voting rules lead to e¢ cient information ag-
gregation?
3.1 Setting the stage
Our objective is to design the voting rule (mechanism) in such a way as to yield
e¢ cient decisions on the basis of informative votes. In short, the voting rule should
render informative voting e¢ cient.9 We begin by justifying this objective. Prima
facie, two goals are of interest. The rule should, rstly, lead to e¢ cient outcomes,
and, secondly, encourage simple-minded, truthful behaviour. By such behaviour we
mean informative voting.10 To reach the second goal, informative voting should be
9By saying informative voting without referring to a particular voter, we mean informative
voting by all voters.
10One might alternatively mean sincere voting  but in practice there is little di¤erence, since
informative and sincere voting coincide under reasonable informational assumptions. As one can
show, if informative voting is not sincere, then there exists a decision d 2 J such that no voter
8
rational, i.e., occur in equilibrium. If informative voting is not just rational, but
also e¢ cient, both goals are reached. So, the double-goal is that informative voting
be e¢ cient and rational. Crucially, as we now show, whenever informative voting
is e¢ cient, it is a fortiori also rational which explains our primary objective that
informative voting be e¢ cient.
Theorem 1 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J 2 ! R.
(a) For any voting rule, if a strategy prole is e¢ cient, then it is rational.
(b) There is an anonymous voting rule for which informative voting is e¢ cient
(hence, rational).
This theorem is general in that it applies to any kind of (common) preferences.
The converse of part (a) does not hold: for instance, a constant voting rule makes
all strategy proles rational, but typically not e¢ cient. The message of part (b) is
positive but so far vague: it is always possible to make informative voting e¢ cient
(and rational), but apart from anonymity we do not know anything about the kind
of voting rule we can use. And indeed, for some kinds of common preferences, it may
not be possible to aggregate in an independent or monotonic way (as counterexamples
show). But, once we narrow down to simple or consequentialist preferences, can or
even must we aggregate in a monotonic resp. independent way? When can or
even must we use a quota rule? Such questions are answered below.
3.2 Simple preferences
This section addresses the case of simple preferences, given by the common utility
function (1). Which rules render informative voting e¢ cient (hence, rational)? The
answer is simple, as we will see. To state our result, we rst dene two coe¢ cients:11
kp := min
(
k 2 f0; 1; :::; n+ 1g : p
1  p >

1  ap
ap
k  ap
1  ap
n k)
; (3)
kq := min
(
k 2 f0; 1; :::; n+ 1g : q
1  q >

1  aq
aq
k  aq
1  aq
n k)
. (4)
These coe¢ cients have an interpretation: as can be proved, for p [q] to be more
probably true than false given all information, at least kp [kq] individuals need to
receive evidence for p [q], i.e., need to have a type containing p [q].
Theorem 2 Assume simple preferences. Informative voting is e¢ cient if and only
if f is the quota rule with the thresholds kp and kq.
ever nds himself in an informational position to consider d as best a rather uninteresting, if not
unnatural scenario.
11The minimum dening kp or kq should be interpreted as n+1 if the set whose minimum is being
taken is empty. In fact, emptiness is impossible under simple preferences. This follows from our
non-degeneracy assumption on the model parameters (which also implies that kp; kq 2 f1; :::; ng).
Note that in (3) and (4) the right hand side of the inequality is strictly decreasing in k.
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This result shows that the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq is the only rule
we may use in view of making informative voting e¢ cient (hence, rational). This
result is much more specic than the purely existential claim in part (b) of Theorem
1. This progress was possible by focusing on simple preferences.
3.3 Consequentialist preferences: rst type
We now turn to consequentialist preferences. Much depends on the nature of the
consequence function. In principle, there exist 24 = 16 potential consequence func-
tions from J to a binary set of consequences. But, as we shall see shortly, there
are only two non-degenerate consequence functions up to isomorphism. We therefore
dene two types of consequentialist functions. Consequentialist preferences (or the
consequence function) are said to be:
 of type 1 if Co(pq) = Co(pq) 6= Co(pq) = Co(pq);
 of type 2 if Co(pq) 6= Co(pq) = Co(pq) = Co(pq).
Our rst two examples of consequentialist preferences in Section 2.2 are of type
1, while our last two examples are of type 2. But why are all non-degenerate con-
sequences of one of these two types? Firstly, consequence functions for which each
decision in J has the same consequence are of course degenerate and therefore un-
interesting. Also consequence functions which depend only on the decision between
p and p, or only on the decision between q and q, are degenerate, since in this case
we are essentially back to a decision problem with a single proposition-negation pair,
which has already been studied in the literature.12 The non-degenerate consequence
functions are those which genuinely depend on both propositions. Among all of them,
some assign each consequence to exactly two decisions in J , while the others assign
one consequence to three decisions and the other consequence to just one decision.
As one can show, the former consequence functions are of type 1, while the latter are
of type 2 up to isomorphism (i.e., up to exchanging p and p and/or exchanging q and
q). Thus, by studying our two types of consequence functions, we will have covered
non-degenerate consequentialist preferences exhaustively.
We now address the rst type, while the next subsection turns to the second type.
One might at rst expect there to be little resemblance between the current prefer-
ences and simple preferences in terms of the appropriate voting rule. For instance,
even when all individuals have type pq, so that there is overwhelming evidence for
state pq, the current preferences allow us to e¢ ciently decide for pq, since this decision
has the same consequence as pq. Surprisingly, despite the di¤erences, consequentialist
preferences of type 1 come much closer to simple preferences than to consequential-
ist preferences of type 2 in terms of mechanism design. The coe¢ cients kp and kq,
dened earlier for simple preferences, again play a key role.
Theorem 3 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 1. A voting rule f makes
informative voting e¢ cient and is monotonic if and only if it is the quota rule with
thresholds kp and kq.
12For instance, our UN intervention example would be degenerate if the question of whether to
intervene only depended on whether the country is considered as being threatened by a military coup
(p or p). The other pair of propositions (q or q) could then be eliminated from the voting process.
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So, as for simple preferences, the social planner is led to impose a quota rule with
the particular thresholds kp and kq. What distinguishes Theorem 3 from Theorem
2 is, for one, its somewhat di¤erent (and longer) proof, and secondly, the additional
monotonicity requirement. Without this extra condition, a number of other voting
rules become possible:
Corollary 1 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 1. A voting rule f makes
informative voting e¢ cient if and only if for every voting prole v 2 J n the decision
f(v) has the same consequence as the decision under the quota rule with thresholds
kp and kq (i.e., Co  f = Co  g, where g is this quota rule).
So, once we drop the monotonicity requirement, there is not just one possible
voting rule, as for simple preferences, but 24
n
possible rules (since there are 2 allowed
decisions for each of the 4n proles in J n).
3.4 Consequentialist preferences: second type
We now turn to consequentialist preferences of type 2. The space of aggregation
possibilities is somewhat di¤erent here. As we shall show, quota rules are not always
possible, and when they are, the two thresholds must be calculated di¤erently.
For all k; l 2 R, we dene the coe¢ cient
(k; l) =
pa
k
p(1  ap)n k
pakp(1  ap)n k + pan kp (1  ap)k
 qa
l
q(1  aq)n l
qalq(1  aq)n l + qan lq (1  aq)l
:
(5)
One can show that (k; l) has a natural interpretation if k; l 2 f0; 1; :::; ng: it is the
probability that the state is pq conditional on having k times evidence for (and n  k
times evidence against) p and l times evidence for (and n  l times evidence against)
q. So, (k; l) = Pr(pqjt) for some (hence, any) type prole t 2 J n containing p
exactly k times and q exactly l times; or equivalently,
(k; l) = Pr(pjp1; :::pk; pk+1; :::; pn) Pr(qjq1; :::; ql; ql+1; :::; qn):
As one can prove by drawing on the denition of the consequence function, given
a type prole t containing p exactly k times and q exactly l times, if (k; l) > 1=2
then only the decision pq is e¢ cient, while otherwise the three other decisions are all
e¢ cient. This implies a rst, simple characterization result. Henceforth, the number
of votes for a proposition r in a voting prole v is written nvr .
Proposition 1 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. A voting rule f makes
informative voting e¢ cient if and only if for every voting prole v 2 J n the decision
f(v) is pq if (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2 and in fpq; pq; pqg otherwise.
Which possibilities if any are left if we require the rule to be a quota rule? We
begin by introducing two coe¢ cients. Given that all voters hold evidence for q, how
many voters with evidence for p does it minimally take for the decision pq to become
e¢ cient? Similarly, given that all voters hold evidence for p, how many voters with
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evidence for q does it take for the decision pq to become e¢ cient? The answer to
these questions is given by the following numbers, respectively:13
lp :=minfk 2 f0; :::; ng : (k; n) > 1=2g (6)
lq :=minfk 2 f0; :::; ng : (n; k) > 1=2g. (7)
Theorem 4 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. There exists a quota rule
making informative voting e¢ cient if and only if (lp; lq) > 1=2. In this case, that
quota rule is unique and has the thresholds lp and lq.
2/1=b2/1<b
2/1=b
pl
ql
ql
(a) There exists no quota rule such that
informative voting is efficient.
(b) There exists a quota rule such that
informative voting is efficient.
2/1>b 2/1>b
2/1<b
pl
k
l l
k
Figure 1: The function 
Figure 1b illustrates the region to which (lp; lq) must belong for a quota rule to
be available. Unlike when preferences are simple or consequentialist of type 1, and
unlike in the classic literature for a single pair of propositions p; p, we have a partial
impossibility:
Corollary 2 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. For some, but not all
combinations of values of the model parameters (p; q; ap; ap; aq; aq and n), there
exists a quota rule making informative voting e¢ cient.
For instance, if p = q = 0:5, ap = aq = ap = aq = 0:7 and n = 3, no quota rule
makes informative voting e¢ cient, whereas if instead p = q = 0:6, the quota rule
with thresholds lp = lq = 2 makes informative voting e¢ cient.
While by Corollary 2 it may be utopian to aim for a full-edged quota rule, we now
show that one can always achieve two characteristic properties of quota rules, namely
anonymity and monotonicity, while often losing the third characteristic property,
namely independence. Specically, we characterize the class of all monotonic and
anonymous (but not necessarily independent) aggregation possibilities. As we shall
see, this class consists of so-called quota rules with exception. Such rules behave
13These two minima are taken over non-empty sets of values of k (by the non-degeneracy assump-
tion at the end of Section 2.3).
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like a quota rule as long as the prole does not fall into an exception domain, while
generating the exception decisionpq on the exception domain. Formally, a quota
rule with exception f : J n ! J is given by thresholds mp;mq 2 f0; :::; n+1g and an
exception domainE  J n, and is dened as follows for all voting proles v 2 J :
if v 62 E then f(v) contains any proposition r in fp; qg if and only if nvr  mr,
while if v 2 E then f(v) = pq ; or equivalently, f(v) contains any r in fp; qg if and
only if [nvr  mr or v 2 E ].14 Standard quota rules arise as special cases with an
empty exception domain. In our characterization theorem, the exception domain is
E = fv : (nvp ; nvq ) > 1=2g, so that
f(v) contains r , [nvr  mr or (nvp ; nvq ) > 1=2], for all r 2 fp; qg and v 2 J : (8)
Theorem 5 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. A voting rule f makes
informative voting e¢ cient and is monotonic and anonymous if and only if f is the
quota rule with exception (8) for some thresholdsmp;mq such that (mp; lq); (lp;mq) >
1=2.
pqqp
qp
qp
qm
pmpl
v
pn
ql
(a) a monotonic and anonymous voting  rule
such that informative voting is efficient
(c) voting rule (9),  obtained by
choosing the thresholds maximal
(b) voting rule (10), obtained by
choosing the thresholds minimal
v
qn
(exception domain)
2/1=b
pqqp
qp
qp
qm
pmpl
v
pn
ql
v
qn
2/1=b
pq
qp
pl
v
pn
ql
v
qn
2/1=b
Figure 2: Illustration of Theorem 5: the decision as a function of the number of votes
for p and q
Figure 2 shows three voting rules of the kind given in Theorem 5, which di¤er in
the choice of the thresholds mp and mq. In Figure 2a, the thresholds are chosen in a
non-extremeway. In Figure 2c, the thresholds are maximal, i.e., mp = mq = n+ 1,
so that the voting rule takes a particularly simple form:
f(v) =

pq if (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2
pq if (nvp ; n
v
q )  1=2
(9)
14The notion of a quota rules with exception could be generalized by allowing the exception decision
to di¤er from pq. The exception decision is pq for us due to the privileged status of pq under
consequentialist preferences of type 2.
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for all voting proles v 2 J n. In Figure 2b, the thresholds are minimal, so that the
voting rule is given as follows:
f(v) =
8>><>>:
pq if (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2
pq if (nvp ; n
v
q )  1=2 and (nvp ; lq) > 1=2
pq if (nvp ; n
v
q )  1=2 and (lp; nvq ) > 1=2
pq otherwise
(10)
The latter rule is special in that it reduces to the quota rule making informative
voting e¢ cient (dened in Theorem 4) whenever such a quota rule exists.
4 When is informative voting sincere?
While the previous section focuses on mechanism design, the present section does not
depend on the voting rule (mechanism). We focus on a single voter and answer the
question of when informative voting is sincere, that is, when the naive strategy of
following the evidenceis worthwhile for a sincere voter. For each type of preference,
we fully characterize the parameter combinations for which this is so. We begin with
simple preferences.
Theorem 6 Under simple preferences, the informative voting strategy is sincere if
and only if ar1 ar  r1 r  1 arar for each r 2 fp; qg.
This result has an intuitive interpretation. We know that necessarily the upper
bound ar1 ar for
r
1 r exceeds 1 and the lower bound
1 ar
ar
is below 1, since ar; ar > 1=2.
For very high or very low values of the prior probabilities r, the ratio r1 r is far from
1, so that one of the bounds is violated and informative voting is not sincere. This
makes sense since if voters have strong prior beliefs, then the evidence collected
cannot overrule the prior beliefs: sincere votes cease to be sensitive to evidence,
i.e., depart from informative votes. By contrast, for less strong prior beliefs, the
inequalities are satised, so that informative voting is sincere, i.e., it is worth following
the evidence as a sincere voter.
Another useful perspective on the result is obtained by focusing not on the para-
meters r representing prior beliefs, but on the parameters ar and ar representing
strength of evidence. The larger ar and ar are (i.e., the strongerprivate evidence
for r and r is), the greater the upper bound for r1 r is and the smaller the lower
bound is, which makes it easier to meet both inequalities. In summary, su¢ ciently
strong evidence and/or su¢ ciently weak prior beliefs imply that it is worth voting
informatively (following the evidence) as a sincere voter.
Surprisingly, the characterization remains the same as we move from simple pref-
erences to consequentialist preferences of type 1 (though the proof is quite di¤erent):
Theorem 7 Under consequentialist preferences of type 1, the informative voting
strategy is sincere if and only if ar1 ar  r1 r  1 arar for each r 2 fp; qg.
One can interpret this result in a similar way as done for simple preferences.
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Finally, we turn to consequentialist preferences of type 2. Here, the characteriza-
tion is based on the following three coe¢ cients:
A :=
p
1  p 
aq
1  aq +
q
1  q 
1  ap
ap
+
1  ap
ap
 aq
1  aq
B :=
p
1  p 
1  aq
aq
+
q
1  q 
ap
1  ap +
ap
1  ap 
1  aq
aq
C :=
p
1  p 
1  aq
aq
+
q
1  q 
1  ap
ap
+
1  ap
ap
 1  aq
aq
.
Theorem 8 Under consequentialist preferences of type 2, the informative voting
strategy is sincere if and only if A;B  p1 p 
q
1 q  C.
Although the characterizing inequalities are more complicated than for the pre-
vious two kinds of preference, an interpretation in terms of strength of evidence is
again possible. If the voters evidence is su¢ ciently strong (i.e., if ap; ap; aq; aq are
su¢ ciently close 1), then C is well below 1 and A and B are well above 1, so that
the inequalities are likely to hold; as a result, informative voting is sincere, i.e., it is
worth following the evidence as a sincere voter.
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A Appendix: proofs
We begin by some preliminary derivations (Section A.1), and then prove our results
in a new order obtained by clustering the results according to the kind of preference
(Sections A.2-5).
Conventions. Recall the notation frintroduced in fn. 4 and the notation Sfor
the random variable generating the state s in J introduced in fn. 8. Double-negations
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cancel each other out, i.e., p stands for p, and q for q. We refer to the two technical
assumptions made at the end of Section 2.3 as non-degeneracyand no e¢ ciency
ties, respectively.
A.1 Preliminary derivations
The joint probability of a state-types vector (s; t) = (spsq; t1pt1q; :::; tnptnq) 2 J n+1
is
Pr(s; t) = Pr(s) Pr(tjs) = Pr(s)
Y
i
Pr(tijs) = Pr(sp) Pr(sq)
Y
i
Pr(tipjsp) Pr(tiqjsq),
where the last two equations follow from our independence assumptions. A voters
probability of a state s = psqs 2 J given his type t = ptqt 2 J is given by Pr(sjt) =
Pr(psjpt) Pr(qsjqt), which reduces to
Pr(sjt) = psaps
psaps + ps(1  aps)
 qsaqs
qsaqs + qs(1  aqs)
if ps = pt; qs = qt (11)
Pr(sjt) = psaps
psaps + ps(1  aps)
 qs(1  aqs)
qs(1  aqs) + qsaqs
if ps = pt; qs 6= qt (12)
Pr(sjt) = ps(1  aps)
ps(1  aps) + psaps
 qsaqs
qsaqs + qs(1  aqs)
if ps 6= pt; qs = qt (13)
Pr(sjt) = ps(1  aps)
ps(1  aps) + psaps
 qs(1  aqs)
qs(1  aqs) + qsaqs
if ps 6= pt; qs 6= qt (14)
The probability of the four states in J conditional on the full information t 2J n is
given as follows, where k := ntp and l := n
t
q:
Pr(pqjt) = pa
k
p(1  ap)n kqalq(1  aq)n l
Pr(t)
(15)
Pr(pqjt) = pa
k
p(1  ap)n kq(1  aq)lan lq
Pr(t)
(16)
Pr(pqjt) = p(1  ap)
kan kp qalq(1  aq)n l
Pr(t)
(17)
Pr(pqjt) = p(1  ap)
kan kp q(1  aq)lan lq
Pr(t)
. (18)
A.2 General preferences
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) We write Ti (= TipTiq) for the random variable generating
voter is type in J , and T = (T1; :::; Tn) for the random type prole. Consider any
voting rule f : J n ! J and any e¢ cient strategy prole  = (1; :::; n). To show
that  is rational, consider any voter i and type ti 2 J . We have to show that is
vote i(ti) maximizes the expected utility conditional on is type, i.e., that
E(u(f(i(ti); i(T i)); S)jti)  E(u(f(vi; i(T i)); S)jti) for all vi 2 J ,
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where (i(ti); i(T i)) and (vi; i(T i)) of course denote the voting proles in
which i votes vi resp. i(ti) and each j 6= i votes j(Tj). To show this, note that for
all vi 2 J ,
E(u(f(vi; i(T i)); S)jti) =
X
t i2J n 1
Pr(t ijti)E(u(f(vi; i(t i)); S)jti; t i)

X
t i2J n 1
Pr(t ijti)E(u(f(i(ti); i(t i)); S)jti; t i)
= E(u(f(i(ti); i(T i)); S)jti),
where the inequality holds because the strategy prole (i; i) =  is e¢ cient for
the type prole (ti; t i) = t.
(b) Since by (15)-(18) the conditional distribution of the state given full inform-
ation t 2 J n depends on t only via the numbers ntp and ntq, so does the condi-
tional expected utility of each decision, and hence, the set of e¢ cient decisions. For
each (k; l) 2 f0; 1; :::; ng2, let F (k; l) 2 J be a decision that is e¢ cient for some
(hence, every) t 2 J n for which ntp = k and ntq = l. The voting rule f dened by
v 7! f(v) = F (nvp ; nvq ) is clearly anonymous and renders informative voting e¢ cient.

A.3 Simple preferences
We begin by two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Assume simple preferences. The expected utility of a decision d 2 J is
E(u(d; S)) = Pr(S = d);
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type prole is given by the
analogous expression with a conditional probability instead of an unconditional one.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the denition of the utility function. 
The next lemma invokes the coe¢ cients kp and kq dened in (3) and (4).
Lemma 2 Assume simple preferences. For all type proles t 2 J n, all r 2 fp; qg,
and all decisions d; d0 2 J such that d but not d0 contains r, and d and d0 share the
other proposition,
E(u(d; S)jt) > E(u(d0; S)jt), ntr  kr.
Proof. Let t 2 J n. We rst prove the equivalence for r = p, d = pq and d0 = pq.
By the denition of kp, the inequality ntp  kp is equivalent to
p
1  p >

1  ap
ap
ntp  ap
1  ap
n ntp
, (19)
which by (15) and (17) is equivalent to Pr(pqjt) > Pr(pqjt), and hence by Lemma 1
to E(u(pq; S)jt) > E(u(pq; S)jt). Next, suppose r = p, d = pq and d0 = pq. Using
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(16) and (18), the inequality (19) is equivalent to Pr(pqjt) > Pr(pqjt), and hence, to
E(u(pq; S)jt) > E(u(pq; S)jt). The proof for the remaining cases is analogous. 
We are now in a position to prove the two theorems about simple preferences.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a rule f : J n ! J .
A. First, assume f is the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq. Consider a given
type prole t 2 J n. Supposing that voters vote informatively, the resulting voting
prole is v = t. We have to show that the decision d := f(v) is e¢ cient for t, i.e.,
that (*) E(u(d; S)jt) > E(u(d0; S)jt) for all d0 2 J nfdg. (We use >rather than
in (*) because of our no e¢ ciency tiesassumption.) The property (*) follows
from Lemma 2. For instance, if d = pq, then by denition of f we have ntp  kp and
ntq  kq, so that Lemma 2 implies the inequality in (*) for d0 = pq and d0 = pq
For instance, if d = pq, then by denition of f we have ntp  kp and ntq  kq, so
that Lemma 2 implies that
E(u(pq; S)jt) > E(u(pq; S)jt); E(u(pq; S)jt) > E(u(pq; S)jt);
which in turn implies (*); and if d = pq, then ntp < kp and n
t
q < kq, so that Lemma 2
implies that
E(u(pq; S)jt) > E(u(pq; S)jt); E(u(pq; S)jt) > E(u(pq; S)jt);
which again implies (*).
B. Conversely, suppose informative voting is e¢ cient under f . We consider any
v 2 J n and r 2 fp; qg, and must show that (**) fr(v) = r , nvr  kr. Consider
the type prole t = v. Since informative voting is e¢ cient, the decision d = f(v)
is e¢ cient for t (= v), i.e., satises condition (*) above. Lemma 2 and (*) together
imply (**). For instance, if f(v) = pq, then (**) holds because, rstly, fr(v) = r,
and secondly, nvr  kr by (*) and Lemma 2. 
Proof of Theorem 6. A. First, assume informative voting is sincere. Equivalently,
for any given type t 2 J , E(u(d; S)jt) is maximal at d = t, i.e., by Lemma 1 (*) Pr(djt)
is maximal at d = t. Applying (*) to type t = pq, we have Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt), which
implies p1 p 
1 ap
ap
by (11) and (13). Now applying (*) to type t = pq, we obtain
Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt), which by (11) and (13) implies ap1 ap 
p
1 p . We have shown
both inequalities relating to p. The two inequalities relating to q can be proved
analogously.
B. Now suppose ar1 ar  r1 r  1 arar for each r 2 fp; qg. We consider any type
t 2 J and have to show that the decision d = t has maximal expected utility given t,
or equivalently, that (*) holds.
We show (*) rst in the case t = pq. Here, the inequality p1 p 
1 ap
ap
implies
Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt) by (11) and (13), and it implies Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt) by (12) and
(14). Further, the inequality q1 q 
1 aq
aq
implies Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt) by (11) and
(12). This shows (*) for t = pq.
Now we show (*) for the case t = pq. As p1 p 
1 ap
ap
, we here have Pr(pqjt) 
Pr(pqjt) by (11) and (13), and we have Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt) by (12) and (14). As
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aq
1 aq 
q
1 q , we also have Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt) by (11) and (12). This proves (*) for
t = pq.
By similar arguments, one shows (*) for t = pq and for t = pq. 
A.4 Consequentialist preferences: type 1
We begin by two lemmas, which are the counterparts of Lemmas 1 and 2 for the
current preferences.
Lemma 3 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 1. The expected utility of a
decision d 2 J is
E(u(d; S)) =

Pr(pq) + Pr(pq) if d 2 fpq; pqg
Pr(pq) + Pr(pq) if d 2 fpq; pqg,
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type prole is given by the
analogous expression with conditional probabilities instead of unconditional ones.
Proof. The claim follows easily from the denition of the utility function. 
Lemma 4 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 1. For each type prole t 2
J n and decisions d 2 fpq; pqg and d0 2 fpq; pqg
E(u(d; S)jt) > E(u(d0; S)jt), [ntr  kr for both or no r 2 fp; qg].
Proof. Consider any t 2 J n, d 2 fpq; pqg and d0 2 fpq; pqg. Dene gr(k) :=
ra
k
r (1  ar)n k and gr(k) := (1  r)(1  ar)kan kr for all r 2 fp; qg and k 2 R. For
each r 2 fp; qg, the denition of kr can now be rewritten as kr = minfk 2 f0; 1; :::; n+
1g : gr(k) > gr(k)g. So, (*) for each k 2 f0; 1; :::; n + 1g, k  kr , gr(k) > gr(k).
(Here, the implication )uses that gr(k) [gr(k)] is strictly increasing [decreasing] in
k 2 R.) Now,
E(u(d; S)jt) > E(u(d0; S)jt)
, Pr(pqjt) + Pr(pqjt) > Pr(pqjt) + Pr(pqjt) by Lemma 3
, gp(ntp)gq(ntq) + gp(ntp)gq(ntq) > gp(ntp)gq(ntq) + gp(ntp)gq(ntq) by (15)-(18)
, gp(ntp)  gp(ntp) gq(ntq)  gq(ntq) > 0
, [ntr  kr for both or no r 2 fp; qg] by (*). 
We can now prove our two theorems about the present preferences.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a rule f : J n ! J .
A. Assume f is the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq. Firstly, f is monotonic.
Secondly, to show that informative voting is e¢ cient, consider a given type prole
t 2 J n. Supposing informative voting, the resulting voting prole is then v := t.
We have to show that d := f(v) is e¢ cient for t; i.e., that for each d0 2 J with
Co(d0) 6= Co(d) we have (*) E(u(d; S)jt)  E(u(d0; S)jt). Consider any d0 2 J with
Co(d0) 6= Co(d). If d = pq, then ntr  kr for both r 2 fp; qg, implying (*) by Lemma
20
4. If d = pq, then ntr  kr for no r 2 fp; qg, again implying (*) by Lemma 4. Finally,
if d is pq or pq, then ntr  kr for exactly one r 2 fp; qg, so that (*) holds once again
by Lemma 4.
B. Conversely, assume f is monotonic and makes informative voting e¢ cient. We
consider any v 2 J n and must show that (**) fr(v) = r , nvr  kr for each
r 2 fp; qg. As one can show using our non-degeneracy assumption,
kr 62 f0; n+ 1g for some r 2 fp; qg; (20)
for instance, if kr were zero for each r 2 fp; qg, then by Lemma 4 the decisions pq
and pq would be ine¢ cient for each type prole, violating non-degeneracy. We now
prove (**) by distinguishing four cases.
Case 1 : nvr  kr for each r 2 fp; qg. We must show that f(v) = pq. Since the
decision f(v) is e¢ cient for the type prole t = v, by Lemma 4, f(v) 2 fpq; pqg.
Suppose for a contradiction f(v) = pq. By (20), kr  1 for some r 2 fp; qg. Suppose
kp > 0 (the case that kq > 0 being analogous). Let v0 be the voting prole obtained
from v by replacing each occurring p by p. By monotonicity, the decision is f(v0) = pq.
By Lemma 4, for the type prole t0 = v0 only pq and pq are e¢ cient since nt0p = 0 < kp
and nt
0
q = n
v
q  kq. So, the decision f(v0) (= pq) is ine¢ cient, a contradiction since
f makes informative voting e¢ cient.
Case 2 : nvp  kp and nvq < kq. We must show that f(v) = pq. By Lemma 4,
pq and pq are both e¢ cient for the type prole t = v. So, as informative voting is
e¢ cient, f(v) 2 fpq; pqg. Suppose for a contradiction f(v) = pq. By (20), kp > 0
or kq  n. First, if kp > 0, dene v0 as in Case 1. By monotonicity, the decision is
f(v0) = pq, which is ine¢ cient for the type prole t0 = v0 by Lemma 4 as nt0p = 0 < kp
and nt
0
q = n
v
q < kq, a contradiction. Second, if kq  n, dene v0 as the voting prole
obtained from v by replacing each occurring q by q. By monotonicity, the decision
is f(v0) = pq, which is again ine¢ cient for the type prole t0 = v0 by Lemma 4 as
nt
0
p = n
v
p  kp and nt
0
q = n  kq, a contradiction.
Case 3 : nvp < kp and n
v
q  kq. One can show that f(v) = pq like in Case 2.
Case 4 : nvr < kr for each r 2 fp; qg. We must show that f(v) = pq. By
informative voting being e¢ cient and by Lemma 4 applied to t = v, f(v) 2 fpq; pqg.
Suppose for a contradiction that f(v) = pq. By (20), kr  n for some r 2 fp; qg.
We assume that kp  n (the proof being analogous if kq  n). Let the voting prole
v0 2 J n arise from v by replacing each occurring p by p. By monotonicity, f(v0) = pq.
This outcome is ine¢ cient for the type prole t0 = v0 by Lemma 4 and nt0p = n  kp
and nt
0
q = n
v
q < kq. 
Proof of Theorem 7. A. First, let informative voting be sincere. Equivalently, for
any type t 2 J , (*) E(u(d; S)jt) is maximal at d = t. Using (*) with t = pq, we have
E(u(pq; S)jt)  E(u(pq; S)jt), which by Lemma 3 is equivalent to Pr(pqjt)+Pr(pqjt) 
Pr(pqjt) + Pr(pqjt). Using (11)-(14), the latter is equivalent to
p
1  p 
q
1  q +
1  ap
ap
 1  aq
aq
 p
1  p 
1  aq
aq
+
q
1  q 
1  ap
ap
;
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which can be rearranged as
p
1  p  
1  ap
ap

q
1  q  
1  aq
aq

 0: (21)
Analogously, using (*) three more times, with t = pq, then t = pq and nally t = pq,
we obtain 
p
1  p  
1  ap
ap

1  q
q
  1  aq
aq

 0 (22)
p
1  p  
ap
1  ap

1  q
q
  aq
1  aq

 0 (23)
p
1  p  
ap
1  ap

q
1  q  
aq
1  aq

 0: (24)
Firstly, (i) q1 q 
1 aq
aq
, since otherwise by (21) we would get p1 p 
1 ap
ap
(< 1),
whereas by (23) we get p1 p 
ap
1 ap (> 1), a contradiction. Secondly, (ii)
p
1 p 
1 ap
ap
, because if (i) holds with a strict inequality, then (ii) follows from (21), whereas
if (i) holds with equality, then q1 q < 1 <
aq
1 aq , which together with (22) implies
(ii). We nally show that (iii) p1 p 
ap
1 ap and (iv)
q
1 q 
aq
1 aq . First, suppose (ii)
holds with equality. Then p1 p < 1 <
ap
1 ap , which implies (iii), and with (24) also
implies (iv). Second, suppose (ii) holds with a strict inequality. Then with (22) we
get (iv). If (iv) holds with a strict inequality, then we get (iii) by (24), while if (iv)
holds with equality, then 1 qq =
1 aq
aq
< 1 <
aq
1 aq , which by (23) implies (iii).
B. Conversely, assume ar1 ar  r1 r  1 arar for each r 2 fp; qg. We have to
show that informative voting is sincere, i.e., that (*) holds for each type t 2 J .
As one can check, the inequalities (21)-(24) all hold. These inequalities imply that
(*) holds for each type t 2 J . For instance, as shown in part A, (21) reduces to
E(u(pq; S)jt)  E(u(pq; S)jt) for t = pq. 
A.5 Consequentialist preferences: type 2
We begin by a simple lemma, the counterpart of Lemmas 1 and 3.
Lemma 5 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. The expected utility of a
decision d 2 J is
E(u(d; S)) =

Pr(pq) if d = pq
1  Pr(pq) if d 6= pq,
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type prole is given by the
analogous expression with conditional probabilities instead of unconditional ones.
Proof. The claim follows from the specication of the utility function. 
We now prove our results about the current preferences. Some proofs implicitly
extend (k; l) to values of k:l not in f0; :::; ng, using the expression (5).
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Proof of proposition 1. The claim can easily be shown by elaborating the in-
formal argument given in the text. 
Proof of theorem 4. A. First, suppose f : J n ! J is a quota rule with thresholds
mp and mq making informative voting e¢ cient. The following claims must be shown.
Claim 1 : mp = lp and mq = lq.
Consider a type prole t 2J n for which ntp = n and ntq = lq. Assuming informative
voting, the resulting voting prole is v = t. By denition of lq, (n; lq) > 1=2. So
f(v) = pq by Proposition 1. Thus, lq  mq by denition of f . One analogously shows
that lp  mp. To show the converse inequalities, consider a voting prole v 2 J n for
which nvp = mp and n
v
q = n ( mq). The resulting decision is f(v) = pq by denition
of f . So, by Proposition 1, (nvp ; n
v
q ) = (mp; n) > 1=2. Hence, mp  lp by denition
of lp. Analogously, one shows that mq  lq.
Claim 2 : (lp; lq) > 1=2.
For any voting prole v 2 J n for which nvp = lp (= mp) and nvq = lq (= mq),
we have f(v) = pq by denition of f , so that by Proposition 1 (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2, i.e.,
(lp; lq) > 1=2.
B. Conversely, assume (lp; lq) > 1=2. We show that the quota rule f with
thresholds lp and lq makes informative voting e¢ cient. We rst prove that for all
k; l 2 f0; :::; ng,
(k; l) > 1=2, [k  lp and l  lq]: (25)
Let k; l 2 f0; :::; ng. If k  lp and l  lq, then (k; l)  (lp; lq) > 1=2, where
the rst inequality holds because  is increasing in each argument. If k < lp, then
(k; l)  (k; n)  1=2, where the last inequality holds by denition of lp (> k).
Analogously, if l  lq, then (k; l)  1=2.
Now consider any type prole t 2 J n. Assuming informative voting, the resulting
voting prole is v = t. We have to show that the decision f(v) is e¢ cient for t (= v).
First, if ntp  lp and ntq  lq, the decision is f(v) = pq, which is e¢ cient by Proposition
1 since (ntp; n
t
q) > 1=2 by (25). Second, if n
t
p < lp or n
t
q < lq, the resulting decision
f(v) is in fpq; pq; pqg, which is e¢ cient by Proposition 1 since (ntp; ntq)  1=2 by
(25). 
Proof of theorem 5. Consider a rule f : J n ! J . We repeatedly draw on the
fact that (*) (k; l) is strictly increasing in each argument.
A. First, assume f is dened by (8) for thresholds mp and mq satisfying (mp; lq);
(lp;mq) > 1=2. Clearly, f is anonymous. To show that informative voting is e¢ cient,
it su¢ ces by Proposition 1 to prove that for all v 2 J n,
f(v) = pq , (nvp ; nvq ) > 1=2: (26)
If (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2, then clearly f(v) = pq by (8). Conversely, assume f(v) = pq.
Then, by denition of f , either nvr  mr for each r 2 fp; qg, or (nvp ; nvq ) > 1=2.
In the second case, we are done. Now assume the rst case. Since (mp; lq) > 1=2,
we have (mp; n) > 1=2 by (*), whence mp  lp by denition of lp. Using (*)
and that nvp  mp  lp and nvq  mq, we have (nvp ; nvq )  (lp;mq). Moreover,
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(lp;mq) > 1=2 by denition of mq. So, (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2, which completes the proof
of (26).
It remains to show monotonicity of f . Take two voting proles v;v0 2 J n such
that for all r 2 f(v), the voters who vote for r in v also vote for r in v0.
Case 1 : f(v) = pq. Then, (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2 by (26). Also, n
v0
p  nvp and nv
0
q  nvq ,
so that (nv
0
p ; n
v0
q )  (nvp ; nvq ) by (*). It follows that (nv
0
p ; n
v0
q ) > 1=2, so that
f(v0) = pq by (26).
Case 2 : f(v) = pq. We have to show that f(v0) = pq, i.e., that
nv
0
p  mp, nv
0
q < mq, and (n
v0
p ; n
v0
q )  1=2: (27)
Since f(v) = pq, the denition of f implies nvp  mp and nvq < mq, and the denition
of v0 implies nv0p  nvp and nv
0
q  nvq ; hence, the rst two inequalities in (27) hold. As
(mp; lq) > 1=2 and nvp  mp, we have (nvp ; lq) > 1=2 by (*). Also, since f(v) = pq,
we have (nvp ; n
v
q )  1=2 by (26). Hence, (nvp ; nvq ) < (nvp ; lq). So, nvq < lq by (*),
whence nv
0
q < lq as n
v0
q  nvq . Thus, by denition of lq, (n; nv
0
q )  1=2, so that
(nv
0
p ; n
v0
q )  1=2 by (*), proving (27).
Case 3 : f(v) = pq. One can show that f(v0) = pq analogously to Case 2.
Case 4 : f(v) = pq. Then, nvp < mp, n
v
q < mq, and (n
v
p ; n
v
q )  1=2. We have to
show that f(v0) = pq, i.e., that these three inequalities still hold if v is replaced by
v0. This follows from the fact that nv0p  nvp and nv
0
q  nvq (by denition of v0) and
from (*).
B. Conversely, let f be monotonic and anonymous, and make informative voting
e¢ cient. For each r 2 fp; qg, dene
mr := minfnvr : v 2 J n such that fr(v) = r and (nvp ; nvq )  1=2g,
where this minimum is interpreted as n+1 if it is taken over an empty set. We prove
that f has the required form with respect to the so-dened thresholds mp and mq.
The proof proceeds in several steps and is completed by Claims 5 and 6 below.
Claim 1 : For all v 2 J n, if nvp  lp, nvq  lq and (nvp ; nvq )  1=2, then f(v) = pq.
Let v 2 J n satisfy the antecedent condition. First assume f(v) = pq for a
contradiction. Let v0 be the voting prole obtained from v by replacing each p by p.
By monotonicity, f(v0) = pq. However, Proposition 1 implies that f(v0) = pq, since
(nv
0
p ; n
v0
q ) = (n; n
v
q )  (n; lq) > 1=2 (where the rst inequality holds by nvq  lq,
and the second by denition of lq). This contradiction proves that f(v) 6= pq. One
similarly proves that f(v) 6= pq. So, as f(v) 2 fpq; pq; pqg by Proposition 1, we have
f(v) = pq, proving the claim.
Claim 2 : For all v 2 J n, if nvp  lp, nvq  lq and (lp; lq)  1=2, then f(v) = pq.
Consider any v 2 J n satisfying the antecedent condition. Let w 2 J n arise from
v by replacing lp nvp occurrences of p by p, lq  nvq occurrences of q by q. Note that
nwp = lp and n
w
q = lq, whence by Claim 1 f(w) = pq. By monotonicity, it follows
that f(v) = pq.
Claim 3 : mp  lp and mq  lq.
Suppose for a contradiction mp < lp. By denition of mp, there is a v 2 J n
such that mp = nvp , fp(v) = p and (n
v
p ; n
v
q )  1=2. As by Proposition 1, f(v) 2
fpq; pq; pqg, it follows that f(v) = pq. We consider two cases.
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Case 1 : nvq  lq. Let v0 2 J n be the voting prole arising from v by replacing
each p by p. By monotonicity, the resulting decision is f(v0) = pq. But f(v0) = pq by
Proposition 1 as (nv
0
p ; n
v0
q ) = (n; n
v
q )  (n; lq) > 1=2 (where the rst inequality
holds by nvq > lq and the second by denition of lq).
Case 2 : nvq < lq. Then by Claim 2 f(v) = pq, a contradiction since f(v) = pq.
We have shown one inequality of Claim 3; the other one has an analogous proof.
Claim 4 : For all v 2 J n with (nvp ; nvq )  1=2, if nvp  mp then f(v) = pq, and
if nvq  mq then f(v) = pq.
Consider any v 2 J n with (nvp ; nvq )  1=2. Suppose for a contradiction that
nvp  mp but f(v) 6= pq. Then, as by Proposition 1 f(v) 2 fpq; pq; pqg, either
f(v) = pq or f(v) = pq.
Case 1 : f(v) = pq. Let v0 2 J n be the voting prole arising from v by replacing
each q by q. By monotonicity, the resulting decision is f(v0) = pq, whereas by
Proposition 1 f(v0) = pq because (nv0p ; nv
0
q ) = (n
v
p ; n)  (lp; n) > 1=2, where the
rst inequality holds because nvp  lp (by Claim 3) and the second inequality holds
by denition of lp.
Case 2 : f(v) = pq. By denition of mp there is a w 2 J n such that nwp = mp,
fp(w) = p and (nwp ; n
w
q )  1=2. As by Proposition 1 f(w) 2 fpq; pq; pqg, it follows
that f(w) = pq. Let v0 [w0] be the voting prole arising from v [w] by replacing each
q by q. By monotonicity, f(v0) = pq and f(w0) = pq. Now let w00 be a voting prole
arising from w0 by replacing nv0p   nw
0
p (= n
v
p  mp  0) occurrences of p by p. By
monotonicity, f(w00) = pq. So, f(w00) 6= f(v0), a contradiction by anonymity since
w00 is a permutation of v0.
This shows the rst implication in Claim 4. The second one can be shown similarly.
Claim 5 : (mp; lq); (lp;mq) > 1=2.
We only show that (mp; lq) > 1=2; the other inequality is analogous. Suppose
for a contradiction that (mp; lq)  1=2. So, since (n + 1; lq) > (n; lq) > 1=2 (by
denition of lq), we have mp 6= n + 1. Hence, there is a v 2 J n such that nvp = mp
and nvq = lq. By Claim 4, f(v) = pq. Let v
0 be the voting prole arising from v
by replacing each p by p. By monotonicity, f(v0) = pq, a contradiction since by
Proposition 1 f(v0) = pq since (nv0p ; nv
0
q ) = (n; lq) > 1=2.
Claim 6 : f is given by (8).
Consider any v 2 J n and r 2 fp; qg. We show the equivalence (8) by dis-
tinguishing di¤erent cases. If (nvp ; n
v
q ) > 1=2, then f(v) = pq by Proposition 1,
implying (8). If (nvp ; n
v
q )  1=2 and nvr  mr, then (8) holds by Claim 4. Finally, if
(nvp ; n
v
q )  1=2 and nvr < mr, then fr(v) 6= r by denition of mr, whence (8) again
holds. 
Proof of Theorem 8. A. First, suppose informative voting is sincere. Equivalently,
for any given type t 2 J , the decision d = t has maximal conditional expected
utility, i.e., (*) E(u(d; S)jt) is maximal at d = t. Applying (*) with t = pq, we have
E(u(pq; S)jt)  E(u(pq; S)jt), which by Lemma 5 reduces to Pr(pqjt)  1  Pr(pqjt),
i.e., to Pr(pqjt)  1=2. Using (11), one derives that p1 p 
q
1 q  C. Now applying
(*) with t = pq, we have E(u(pq; S)jt)  E(u(pq; S)jt), which by Lemma 5 reduces to
1 Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt), so that Pr(pqjt)  1=2. Using (12), one obtains p1 p
q
1 q 
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A. Finally, applying (*) with t = pq, we have E(u(pq; S)jt)  E(u(pq; S)jt), which
by Lemma 5 reduces to 1  Pr(pqjt)  Pr(pqjt), whence Pr(pqjt)  1=2. Using (13),
one derives p1 p 
q
1 q  B. This proves all inequalities.
B. Conversely, suppose A;B  p1 p 
q
1 q  C. For each given type t 2 J , one
has to show (*). As the reader can verify using Lemma 5 and (11)-(14), if t = pq then
(*) follows from p1 p 
q
1 q  C; if t = pq then (*) follows from A 
p
1 p 
q
1 q ; if
t = pq then (*) follows from B  p1 p 
q
1 q ; and if t = pq then (*) can be derived
from A  p1 p 
q
1 q or from B 
p
1 p 
q
1 q . 
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